Richter und Verteidiger

(what follows is mostly a short close reading of an essay by Leibniz. Not super interesting, but I don’t have time to blog due to thesis chapter concerns and it’s also not super bad. so if you can read German and odd theological debates are your thing, have fun)

Richter und Verteidiger – Das Verhältnis von Glaube und Vernunft in Leibniz’ „Abhandlung über die Übereinstimmung des Glaubens mit der Vernunft“

Wenn man Leibniz’ „Abhandlung über die Übereinstimmung des Glaubens mit der Vernunft“ liest, den Essay, der den drei Teilen seiner Theodizee vorangesetzt ist, dann kann man sich des Eindrucks nicht erwehren, man lausche hier aktuellen Debatten. Der Versuch Leibniz’, in einer Art Antwort auf Pierre Bayle die Rolle der Vernunft in den Angelegenheiten des Glaubens festzulegen, ist in seiner Klarheit und argumentativen Kraft nicht hinter Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts anzusiedeln. Ganz explizit weist Leibniz die Behauptungen anderer Theologen seiner Zeit zurück, der Glaube triumphiere über die Vernunft und keineswegs ist Leibniz’ Essay als Versuch zu werten, die Grenzen von Glauben und Vernunft gegeneinander abzustecken.

Im Gegenteil: der Universalgelehrte Leibniz, der neben seiner Theologie auch maßgebliche Errungenschaften auf so unterschiedlichen Gebieten wie der Linguistik und vor allem der Mathematik vorweisen kann, sieht keinen Widerspruch zwischen Glauben und Vernunft, und gleichzeitig gibt er dem christlichen Debattanten Argumentationsmittel an die Hand, wie mit rationalistischen Argumenten umzugehen ist. Beide Aspekte passen in gut in unsere Zeit, in der sich religiöse Menschen oft lauter sekulärer Kritik ausgesetzt sehen und deshalb verstärkt auf Positionen ausweichen, die die Mysterien des Glaubens kategorisch über jedwede mögliche rationalistische oder szientistische Argumente stellen. Im vorliegenden Essay wird zunächst eine Darstellung des Leibnizschen Arguments in der „Abhandlung“ versucht, und im Anschluss dargestellt, wie das Verhältnis des Vernunftbegriffs im expositorischen Essay sich verhält zum ersten Teil der eigentlichen Theodizee, in die Vernunft ebenfalls eine wichtige Rolle spielt.

Geboren 4 Jahre nach dem Tod René Descartes und ein Zeitgenosse Spinozas, war die Diskussion zwischen Rationalisten und Fideisten für Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz nichts Neues und so setzt er einem seiner letzten großen Werke, der 6 Jahre vor seinem Tod erschienenen Theodizee1, einen umfänglichen Essay voran, die „Abhandlung über die Übereinstimmung des Glaubens mit der Vernunft“. Der Grund dafür wird dem Leser schnell klar, denn in der Theodizee ist es Leibniz’ Anliegen, Vernunftgründe für eine der ältesten Fragen der christlichen Theologie zu finden: „Si Deus est, unde malum, si non est, unde bonum?“. Keineswegs zieht sich Leibniz auf eine Beschwörung der Mysterien zurück; statt dessen liefert er eine genaue Analyse der Materie, wobei er Annahmen, Schlüsse und Spekulationen immer streng von einander trennt.

Gleich zu Beginn schreibt er zuversichtlich: „gibt es triftige Wahrscheinlichkeitseinwände gegen uns, so haben wir Beweise“. Dies ist eine Formulierung, die der Klärung bedarf, aber nichts im Haupttext der Theodizee zuvor klärt dies zufriedenstellend auf. Vielmehr ist diese Formulierung der „Abhandlung“ geschuldet, in der sehr methodisch die Begriffe des Einwands, des Beweises und des zulässigen Arguments herausgearbeitet werden. Will man die Leibnizsche Argumentation zusammenfassen, bietet sich die Figur des Gerichts an, die Leibniz selbst einführt, vermittels einer Kritik an Pierre Bayle.

Grundsätzlich ist festzuhalten, dass die ganze „Abhandlung“ im Wesentlichen als Antwort auf Bayle zu lesen ist, der die Vernunft und den Glauben streng gegeneinander abgrenzt, und dabei die Vernunft als „ein zerstörendes, kein aufbauendes Prinzip“ versteht. Bayle erblickt die Stärke des Glaubens […] darin, dass seine Wahrheiten die Angriffe der Vernunft nicht aushalten können und dass er sich trotzdem in den Herzen der Gläubigen erhält“. Für Leibniz ist dies eine inakzeptable Haltung: wenn ein Glaubensinhalt das Licht der Vernunft nicht aushält, dann muss er falsch sein, denn nach Leibniz „bildet [die Vernunft] die Grundlage [des Christentums]“.

Während Bayle den besonderen Wert der Religion darin sieht, dass sie auch angesichts unwiderleglicher Argumente gegen ihre Wahrheiten gültig bleibt, weist Leibniz die Existenz unwiderleglicher Einwürfe gegen Wahrheiten zurück. Wenn Einwürfe unwiderleglich sind, dann sind die vorgeblichen Wahrheiten schlicht falsch, denn „was ist ein unwiderlegliches Argument anders als ein Beweis?“. Eine Wahrheit ist also etwas, das nicht widerlegt werden kann. Tatsächlich sind Wahrheiten zentral für die Diskussion in der „Abhandlung“.

Die Wichtigkeit von Wahrheiten für Leibniz’ „Abhandlung über die Übereinstimmung des Glaubens mit der Vernunft“ ergibt sich daraus, dass Wahrheiten nicht ausschließlich einer der beiden Sphären zuzuordnen sind. Der Glauben ruht auf der von Gott offenbarten Wahrheit, und die Vernunft ist „die Verkettung der Wahrheiten“, wobei die Vernunft nicht nur für Verbindungen zwischen religiösen Wahrheiten zuständig ist, sondern auf und besonders für diejenigen, „zu denen der menschliche Geist auf natürliche Weise gelangen kann, ohne vom Licht des Glaubens erleuchtet zu werden“. Zwei Wahrheiten können einander nicht widersprechen. Es gibt grob gesprochen zwei Arten von Wahrheiten: zum einen „ewige Wahrheiten“, die man nicht vernünftig bestreiten kann ohne „auf Absurditäten geführt zu werden.“ Sie sind absolut notwendig. Zu ihnen gehören logische und geometrische Wahrheiten.

Die anderen Wahrheiten sind die sogenannten „Tatsachenwahrheiten“, die auf Naturgesetzen beruhen oder selbst solche Gesetze darstellen. Sie kann man entweder beobachten oder mithilfe der Vernunft selbst a priori aus der harmonischen Ordnung der Welt schließen. Gott hat zwar diese Regeln geschaffen, aber da sie nicht absolut notwendig sind, kann Gott in seiner Schöpfung „etwas erzeugen […], was ihrer Natur nicht entspricht, indem er ein Wunder tut.“ Dies folgt aus der Tatsache, dass die eben erwähnte „Verkettung“ von Wahrheiten der natürlichen Welt nicht solche Wahrheiten enthält, die Glaubensinhalte sind; somit übersteigen die Mysterien unsere Vernunft. Das heißt allerdings nicht, dass sie der Vernunft widersprechen. Auch wenn wir mit unserem unvollkommenem Vernunftgebrauch oft vielleicht Schwierigkeiten haben, eine Übereinstimmung zwischen Mysterien und Vernunft zu erkennen, „erkennen [wir] wenigstens niemals […] einen Gegensatz zwischen den Mysterien und der Vernunft.“.

Leibniz sieht keinen Gegensatz zwischen Glauben und Vernunft, nur unterschiedliche Grade der Vollkommenheit. Die Vernunft der Menschen ist eine „Teilvernunft“, aber sie ist eben ein Teil der größeren „in Gott befindlichen“ Vernunft. Das bedeutet, dass Gott zwar die Tatsachenwahrheiten geschaffen hat, er aber nicht an sie gebunden ist, was wiederum eine Argumentation mit bzw. gegen den Glauben schwierig macht. Denn wenn man sich gegen den Glauben auf Tatsachenwahrheiten bezieht, kann man höchstens Wahrscheinlichkeitseinwände aufbringen, aber das Mysterium der Religion bedeutet, dass, wenn Gott etwas für gut befindet, er es einfach ändern kann. Es scheint somit, als ob in den Debatten zwischen Glauben und rationalistischem Zweifel der Glauben immer Oberhand hätte. Wie wir bereits aus Bayles Beschwerden über „unwiderlegliche“ Argumente gesehen haben, ist es jedoch keineswegs der Fall.

Bayle stellt fest, dass die Mysterien des Glaubens einen entscheidenden Nachteil haben. Es stimmt tatsächlich, dass Zweifler keine Einsicht in die Mysterien haben, und somit bei einer Argumentation, die auf Tatsachenwahrheiten beruht, im Nachteil sind, allerdings haben auch Christen keinen solchen Einblick. Als Gläubiger kann man zwar Mysterien verstehen, aber nur über den Umweg der Analogie, aber eben nicht „bis zur völligen Erfassung und zum Verständnis des „Wie?“.

Leibniz unterscheidet nun vier verschiedene Begriffe: „’erklären’, ‘begreifen’, ‘beweisen’ und ‘behaupten’“. Man kann die Mysterien, wie auch physikalische Wahrheiten, „erklären“, aber „begreifen“ oder gar „beweisen“ kann man sie nicht. Es ist wichtig zu verstehen, dass es sich bei der Unterscheidung zwischen „erklären“ und „begreifen“ nicht um eine Unterscheidung im Sinne Diltheys (Dilthey schrieb etwa „die Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir“ Diese Unterscheidung hilft Dilthey, die Geisteswissenschaften von den Naturwissenschaften zu trennen.) handelt. Vielmehr handelt es sich um unterschiedliche Grade an Beweiskraft.

Hier kommen wir nun endlich zur Figur des Gerichts. Da Bayle einig ist mit Leibniz über die Schwierigkeiten, die im Begreifen oder gar Beweisen der Mysterien liegen, sorgt er sich, dass er Einwürfe nicht beantworten kann, da er ja seine „Partei“, seine Glaubensinhalte überhaupt nur bis zu einem gewissen Punkt erklären kann; Leibniz hingegen stellt fest, dass die Beweislast überhaupt nicht bei den Christen liegt. Alles, was sie machen müssen, ist, die Einwände zu entkräften. Wenn die Situation so ist, dass der zu debattierende Gegenstand gar nicht der Glaube ist, sondern die Argumente der Zweifler, so ist die Diskussion schon viel einfacher zu führen, denn „[e]in gerichtlicher Verteidiger ist für gewöhnlich nicht gezwungen, sein Recht zu beweisen […], wohl aber ist er gezwungen, auf die Gründe des Anklägers zu antworten.“.

Wenn Christen in der Rolle des Verteidigers sich nach ähnlichen Regeln verhalten wie echte Verteidiger es in Gerichten tun, so haben sie eine Vielzahl an Möglichkeiten, Kritik zu entgegnen. Die Hauptkritik an den Mysterien ist eine, die die Wahrscheinlichkeit ins Feld führt. Leibniz führt in der ganzen Abhandlung immer wieder aus, wie man solchen Kritiken entgegnet: so kann man, wie in einem wirklichen Gericht, den hervorragenden Leumund des Beschuldigten anführen; man kann darauf hinweisen, dass es Dinge gibt, „die dem Sinnenschein entgegengesetzt sind, die wir aber dennoch gelten lassen, wenn sie sehr gut verifiziert sind“, das heißt, auch bei nicht-religiösen Umständen lassen wir nicht immer die Erfahrung gelten, denn sogar „bei den Naturkundigen [werden uns] häufig genug über den trügerischen Schein durch […] höhere Gründe die Augen geöffnet werden.“

Diese finale Zurechtweisung der zweifelnden Kritik in ein Netz von Debattierungs- und Gerichtsregeln kommt nicht umsonst gegen Ende der „Abhandlung“. Obwohl Leibniz es nicht explizit sagt, ist die Analogie zum Rechtswesen ein geschickter Versuch, theologische Debatten intellektuell zu legitimieren. Mehr als 200 Jahre vor Niklas Luhmann leistet Leibniz für den Bereich der Theologie, was jener in seiner 1969 erschienenen Abhandlung Legitimation durch Verfahren im Bereich der Soziologie machen sollte: eine Untersuchung, wie Verfahren aussehen können, die Wahrheiten im öffentlichen Raum etablieren können, die nicht einzig oder besonders durch naturwissenschaftliche Mittel beweis- bzw. legitimierbar sind.

Dass die Gerichtssituation solch einen wichtige Stelle in der „Abhandlung“ einnimmt, macht es interessanter, dass Leibniz in seiner Diskussion der Frage nach der göttlichen Gerechtigkeit so deutlich gegen die Idee stellt, Gott sei ein grausamer Richter. Seine erklärte Absicht in der Theodizee ist es, „die Menschen von ihren falschen Vorstellungen abzubringen, als ob Gott ein absoluter Fürst sei [und] nach Willkür verfährt“. Nicht die Furcht vor Gott, sondern die Bewunderung seiner Güte soll am Ende der Theodizee stellen.

Da es im vorliegenden Essay um die Rolle der Vernunft und nicht die Darstellung der Theodizee oder eine Diskussion ihrer Stichhaltigkeit geht, soll sie nur kurz zusammengefasst werden: Gott erschuf diese Welt als die beste aller möglichen Welten. Es gibt eine fast unendliche Zahl an möglichen Welten, da jedes Ding auf der Welt auf zweierlei Art bestimmt ist, die Leibniz im „Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes“ zusammenfasst, das sich um die Frage dreht, „warum etwas existiert und nicht lieber nicht existiert und warum es lieber auf diese als auf jede andere Weise existiert.“ (Dies ist offensichtlich eine frühe Version des Gottesbeweises, wie er wenige Jahre später von Leibniz in der Monadologie veröffentlicht wird. Zu einer Darstellung und Kritik des Gottesbeweises in der Monadologie, cf. Bromand und Kreis 120-127. Besonders spannend im Kontext der vorliegenden Diskussion ist, dass, wie Bromand und Kreis darlegen, Leibniz versucht, den Descartesschen Gottesbeweis zu retten, indem er die Prämisse hinzufügt „Wenn es möglich ist, dass ein göttliches Wesen existiert…“. Wir erkennen in dieser Formulierung den Gedankengang desjenigen Philosophen wieder, der eine ganze Abhandlung geschrieben hat, die mit Vorschlägen endete, wie man am besten nicht-religiöse Zweifler überzeugt. ‘Ist es denn nicht zumindest möglich, dass ein göttliches Wesen existiert…?’ passt perfekt in die Reihe rhetorischer Argumente, die Leibniz sonst darlegt..) Da Gott gut ist und vollkommen, hat er aus der Vielzahl der möglichen Welten die beste herausgesucht. Wenn es Böses in dieser Welt gibt, dann deshalb, weil es in der Welt ohne dieses Böse schlechter wäre. Alle Dinge in der Welt sind miteinander verbunden, und die Gesamtsituation ist, so wie sie ist optimal im mathematischen Sinn26. Gott will das beste, und nimmt das Übel als Notwendigkeit, um in der von ihm gewählten Welt „eine höhere Vollkommenheit“ zu erreichen.

Wir finden auch im Haupttext der Theodizee die Behauptung wieder, dass Gott selbst Verstand ist, und dass „die wesentliche Natur der Dinge […] Gegenstand des Verstandes [ist]“. Was die „Teilvernunft“ der Menschen angeht, so stellt sich die Situation komplexer dar, als noch in der „Abhandlung“. Personen werden von Leibniz so definiert, dass sie aus der Verbindung zwischen Seele und Körper hervorgehen. Seelen sind laut Leibniz zwar ewig, „mit Vorstellungsvermögen und Empfindung begabt, aber ohne Vernunft“. Erst wenn sie auf den Menschen, zu dem sie gehören, bei dessen Zeugung übergehen, werden auch sie vernunftbegabt. Und es ist die Vernunft des Menschen, in Verbindung mit seiner Spontaneität und Zufälligkeit, die seine Willensfreiheit überhaupt erst bedingt und ihn in die Möglichkeit versetzt, die besondere Güte Gottes zu erfahren.

Es ist an verschiedener Stelle angemerkt worden, dass der Optimismus Leibniz’, der die Übel der Welt zugunsten des Guten untergewichtet, der vom Glauben an das Wollen Gottes, die Vernünftigkeit der Welt postuliert. Da er das Böse und die Übel auf die leichte Schulter zu nehmen scheint mag es vielleicht überraschen, dass der Schluss dieser Arbeit ein Vorschlag ist, dass es Leibniz vielleicht zu einem grossen Teil um Hoffnung geht. Der Begriff des Glaubens taucht im ersten Teil der Theodizee kaum noch auf, nachdem er so zentral in der „Abhandlung“ war. Es ist deshalb nicht unwahrscheinlich, dass der Begriff sich gewandelt hat. In der Theodizee ist die Vernunft ein entscheidender Begriff: durch die Vernunft wird die Wahl der besten Welt determiniert und die Vernunft ist das entscheidende Element bei der Menschwerdung von Personen. Es ist die These dieses Essays, dass die rhetorischen Strategien der „Abhandlung“ mehr sind, als ein Mittel, eine Diskussion zu gewinnen. Es ist ein Versuch, Hoffnung in die Welt zu tragen, indem das Böse umgedeutet wird: zur Möglichkeit des Guten. Ingolf Dalferth schreibt, dass „Gott […] erst dann wirklich als Gott gedacht [wird], wenn er für jeden an seinem Ort als Überwinder seiner Übel und Verwirklicher des für ihn Guten gedacht wird“. Durch die Legitimation der Theodizee als öffentlicher Diskurs versucht Leibniz es zu ermöglichen, dass das Gute gerade weniger erdrückend ist.

***

The bibliography for this is pitiful and not worth mentioning except for the excellent

Bromand, Joachim; Guido Kreis (hrsg.). Gottesbeweise von Anselm bis Gödel. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2011.

which is fantastic.

Blogroll updated

I updated my blogroll. If you don’t have the habit of looking at my margins, check the full list here. Any suggestions are very welcome. Some posts seem dead, but that’s to do with troubles at the blogsport provider. All blogs you can access are fantastic.

Questions of translation

DSC_0295Below is the beginning of the postscript of Hans Mayer‘s translation of Sartre’s Les Mots into German. I’ve read it first many years ago, before I was fluent in French, and through all that time, that postscript has been a kind of touchstone in some ways to my thinking about literary translation and my own translations. The bit below is an explanation of why Mayer chose “Die Wörter” and not “Die Worte” as a translation of <les mots>. There’s a distinct possibility that this is only of interest to me, so I’m sorry about that.

Als die Übersetzungsarbeit bereits abgeschlossen war, blieb immer noch der Zweifel, wie es mit der Eindeutschung des Titels zu halten sei. “Les Mots” – das übersetzt jeder natürlich mit “Die Worte”. Beim ersten Lesen von Sartres Bericht über seine Kindheitsentwicklung und die Ursprünge seiner Lebensentscheidung für die Schriftstellerei mußte jedoch angemerkt werden, daß diese für Sartres gesamtes Leben so bedeutungsvolle Grundsituation gar nicht durch Worte im Zusammenhang erzeugt worden war, also durch Worte, die sich zu Texten – für Sartre: zu geheiligten Texten – koordiniert hatten, sondern durch etwas anderes. Was? Offensichtlich durch die für den kleinen Poulou so zehrende und verzaubernde Magie einzelner Wörter, die es vermocht hatten, dem Kind sich aufzuzwingen. [...] Für den kleinen Poulou [...] hatten die Wörter eine fremdartige Körperlichkeit angenommen. [...] Sie waren verdinglicht und standen für die Welt. Sein Weg führte zur Wirklichkeit führte über zahllose Begegnungen mit Wortgebilden. Im Anfang waren die Wörter, das ist hier “wörtlich” zu nehmen. Es war nicht das Wort im Sinne des Logos, was für Sartre am Anfang stand. Sein Weg führte von den Wörtern zu den Worten, dann von den Worten zu den Sachen. So wird man die Geschichte, die Sartre, der bald Sechzigjährige, niederschrieb, wohl verstehen müssen. Im Deutschen hatte also der Titel zu lauten “Die Wörter”.

Nobel Prize 2014: my picks

Since I have never correctly picked (well, Tranströmer, kind of) the winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature, my picks should not be given much attention. Nevertheless, I feel compelled to offer my suggestions. So here are five of them. With a few exceptions, I am not trying to second guess the academy. They are not unlikely to offer it to another boring candidate. It is my belief that, starting with Vargas Llosa, they started giving the prize to candidates that won’t be likely to upset the white male dominant culture of criticism. Tranströmer was the one poet whose name was touted every year, as well as perennial nobel contender Mo Yan. The pattern of the new “sure that makes sense”-prize became most obvious last year when Alice Munro won. If they wanted to give it to a white, female, important, accomplished Canadian writer of short stories, why not give it to Mavis Gallant, who, in my opinion, is significantly better than the already excellent Munro. Before 2010, I have no doubt this would have been given to Gallant. But maybe the double whammy of Le Clèzio and Müller intimidated the academy into its present, boring, if not objectionable course.  I sincerely don’t want to think what the “sure, why not” option for 2014 could be. Philip Roth? Murakami? My heart weeps. Let’s just go on to my picks. :)

ONE  My #1 wish every year is to give it to a poet, being a poet myself and writing a dissertation on poetry. I also think the genre is criminally underrepresented. But factually, it’s probably not (was Churchill the last nonfiction winner?). So in first place is poetry, and the three living poets that I consider most excellent/deserving. I used to put Bei Dao on the list (and not just because he’s charming in person), but two years after Mo Yan’s win, that’s not going to happen. So my list of poets is headlined by John Ashbery who I consider not only to be an absolutely excellent poet, but whose influence both on American poetry of his time, and on our reading of older poetry is importand and enduring. Additionally, his work in translating French poetry and writing on art is both accomplished, but also draws him out of what the academy perceives as American insularity. His work is personal and generous, smart and emotional, international and profoundly American. A close/equal second for me is Syrian poet Adonis, whose work, as far as I read it in French, English and German translation, offers poetry that is both lyrical and intellectually acute. He is a politically passionate poet whose sensibilities prevent him from writing bland political pamphlets. What’s more, he is critically important to Arabic poetry as a scholar, teacher and editor. In a region, where weapons often speak louder that words, and words themselves are enlisted to provide ammunition rather than pleasure, Adonis’s work provides both clarity as well as lyrical wellspring of linguistic nourishment. His work in preserving and encouraging a poetic culture in a war torn environment is not just admirable and fantastically accomplished, it is also worth being recognized and highlighted. The third poet is Yves Bonnefoy, the most significant and important living French poet. Since I have only read his poetry (with great pleasure) and not studied it or his broader work, here is someone else’s excellent discussion of Bonnefoy. Moreover, Bonnefoy, like Ashbery, has been writing about art and produced fantastic translations (from English). So as we see, my first pick is actually three and could be longer (Jaccottet, the Swiss French genius would come to mind, maybe Zagajewsky). But I feel like there’s only room for one poet on a shortlist, for reasons that don’t apply to writers of novels who are often only perceived as “writers”.

TWO The same applies to nonfiction which has not had a winner in decades. So I will mention more than one here, #1 surely should be Umberto Eco. While he’s also a novelist, and perhaps more widely known as such, his work in the fringes of philosophy and in literary criticism and theory is significant, wide ranging and influential. I don’t think any other writer as important and accomplished and widely read in his field is still alive. What’s more, his work is fantastically well written, at least in English translation. Similar things apply to my other pick in this category, Hilary Putnam. I always thought Stanley Cavell should be considered, with his wide range from philosophy to literary and film criticism, but as long as Hilary Putnam is still around, a nonfiction Nobel that is not awarded to him or Eco would be upsetting, Putnam’s increasingly mystical examinations of reality and language are blindingly well written and incredibly influential, even among the many people disagreeing with him.

THREE The novelist that I most want to win the prize is Ngugi wa Thiong’o. There’s his literary skill. His early novels written in English, as well as the more allegorical Wizard of the Crow and the recent, clear-eyed and powerful memoirs, all of this is written by an excellent writer. He moves between genres, changing techniques and eventually even languages, all with impressive ease. So he’s a very good writer, but he’s also politically significant. As the literary conscience of a tumultuous Kenya, he highlights struggles, the oppressed and shines a light on how his young country deals with history and power. In the course of his literary and cultural activism he was eventually imprisoned for a while by Kenyatta’s successor. After his release he was forced into exile. Yet through all this, he continued, like Adonis, to work with and encourage cultural processes in his home country. Starting with his decision, in the late 1970s, to stop writing in English, instead using Gikuyu and translating his books into English later. He supported and helped create and sustain a native literary culture that used native languages and interrogated political processes in Kenya. A cultural, politcal and linguistic conscience of his home country, it’s hard to come up with a living writer who better fits the demands of the academy. Of the writers I root for, this one is the only one who would also fit the “obvious choice” pattern of recent decisions.

FOUR Now. I think Thomas Pynchon, together with William H. Gass and Joyce Carol Oates, is the best and most important and accomplished living American novelist. I think his work is unbelievably well written, brilliantly conceived and incredibly influential. His thinking is generous and humane, his work being engaged against epistemological and political violence. He has tackled and succeeded in writing a multitude of different kinds of books. There are very few significant contemporary writers whose work is not marked in one way or another by Pynchon. Now, at the same time, he said he wouldn’t accept the prize and I completely understand why this would keep the academy from giving him the prize. Nobody needs a Marlon Brando moment at the ceremony. That said, my pick for #4 is not Pynchon. I advocate a joint award for Pynchon and John Barth or even Pynchon, Barth and Robert Coover. It’s been a while since we had joint Nobel Prizes in Literature but it’s not unheard-of. John Barth, even more than Pynchon, is a profound and enduring influence not just on American literature post-1960, but on world literature. Young postmodern novelist, say, Austrian firebrand Clemens J. Setz, are unthinkable without Barth’s work that continued into the 1980s. While his work since then has been of much lesser impact, the academy has shown itself willing to award writers whose best work had been behind them for quite a while. The two mid-oughts awards for Lessing and Pinter are pretty clear evidence of that fact. Giving an award to Pynchon and Barth would be an overdue recognition of the excellence and importance of American early postmodernism. Well deserved.

FIVE So the fifth pick I am least sure. There are a couple of excellent/important writers who are too young to win it, among them Romanian writer Mircea Cartarescu and Russian emigré novelist Mikhail Shishkin. Juan Goytisolo appears to be worthy, but I haven’t read his work enough to have an opinion worth sharing. Similarly, due to accessibility problems, I have only read parts of the work of Gerald Murnane who is unbelievably great. But older parts of his work are out of print, and newer parts have not been published outside of Australia yet. First book, no, first page of his I read I could not believe how good he is, but, again, mostly not been able to read him. A writer I did read, Pierre Guyotat, is a much older writer I would not mind being recognized for his excellence and significance. But the recent death of Siegfried Lenz, who was more than deserving of the award, reminded me of the now best German living active novelist: Reinhard Jirgl. A disciple of Heiner Müller, Jirgl rose from being a mechanic and stage hand to winning German literature’s most prestigious award, the Büchner Preis. Jirgl’s work, originally prevented from being published in the GDR, initially was highly influenced by Müller, whose mixture of stark physicality, and strenuously literary, even stiff, language pervades Jirgl’s Genealogie des Tötens, a book that collects his earliest manuscripts that were prevented from being published in the GDR. Another influence on that book, and more, on his later work, is Arno Schmidt. In his later work, Jirgl interrogates impotence and the violence of social relationships and injustice. His language is literary and inventive, and as his work progresses, he increasingly changes and manipulates the limits of the form of the literary novel, by offering Cortázar-like shortcuts through the sequence of the novel (Abtrünnig) or by engaging with the genre of science fiction (Nichts von euch auf Erden). Quietly, he has become part of the intellectual, historical and moral conscience of Germany, a country increasingly unafraid (again) of waging war on others, and a country that is trying to exculpate itself from its awful early 20th century history. Jirgl has won almost every German prize imaginable but his powerful and gorgeously written work has not found recognition outside of Germany and France. Maybe it’s time.

RIP Siegfried Lenz

Siegfried Lenz has just died. The best living German writer of short stories and one of the best novelists has never, regrettably, consistently received the attention abroad that his contemporaries have. Grass and Böll have not only won a Nobel Prize each, their translations are also in print in English and keep being reprinted, the same is not true for Lenz. Maybe the Nobel Prize is the main reason for this success in translation, maybe overt political engagement is more attractive to English readers. I wish I could offer a thorough discussion of Lenz here, but right now I can’t. I just felt the acute need to note this loss not just to German literature, but to world literature. I wish I could link to a wealth of reviews of his work by me, but while I can link to a dozen reviews of fantasy books, there is only one review of a Lenz novel. If you’re interested, here’s where you should click. In it I make some general comments on his work. As it is, all I can do is recommend you read his books, as far as they’ve been translated. One hopes that in the future, presses like NYRB Books will find a translator to take on Lenz’ challenging but readable work. He was a unique writer, and of the great triad of German post war literature, he was just as good as Grass and miles better than Böll.

1300 pages of genius

So this just came out. I will return my copy due to not being able to afford it, but it’s still awesome. 1300 pages of genius. Roth, despite all the praise he has received, is still one of America’s underappreciated novelists, and Call It Sleep one of the major masterpieces published before WWII. This book collects his late novels in one volume for the first time and it’s gorgeous, and gorgeously produced, as well.

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John Irving: In One Person

Irving, John (2012), In One Person, Simon & Schuster
ISBN 9781451664126

IMG_20141001_012503So in my recent run of reviews I reviewed and discussed some writers I enjoy greatly. Among them perennial favorites. I however like to think that I am good at being reasonably, well, reasonable and reasoned about these matters. With a handful of writers, I just completely lose that ability. One of those writers is John Irving. I cannot, with any degree of certainty, tell you whether he’s a genuinely good writer. I know I love his work. I am excited for his books to come out, I enjoy his writing and characters and plots greatly, I’m just fundamentally a fan of his work. When I mentioned, in my review of Lawrence Norfolk’s last novel, that it was like comfort food when it came out after such a long period of silence, well, that’s how Irving’s work is for me all of the time. That is not to say that I don’t see faults in his work. It’s just that they don’t necessarily influence what I think of the books. A Son of the Circus, a highly problematic book, is also one of my favorites. I make exceptions for exactly 3 of his novels. I think his first two novels are markedly subpar, apprentice efforts, but many writers have those. And then there’s The Fourth Hand (2001), which I read the minute it came out and which turned out to be a sloppy, rushed self-caricature of a novel that I always somehow blamed on his preoccupation with what he called his “movie business”. Irving has since nicely recovered from it, publishing good to very good novels. His most recent one, In One Person may just be his best novel in many years, one of his very best efforts. As far as I can tell. A writer whose work I am so personally influenced by and indebted to is hard to recommend to others, but I can say this much: if you have read any other Irving book and enjoyed it, you will like this one, as well. In many ways it serves as a summary of a long and great career, touching on issues, tropes and ideas prevalent in many of his best books. That said, there’s a second group of readers to whom I can issue a definite recommendation: if you read any Irving and fundamentally disliked it, this is also not for you. It is not a book that will win over critics of his work. For everyone else, I recommend reading the rest of my review, maybe. In my opinion, In One Person, an interrogation of how the life that we led outlasts us, is a fantastic book, maybe even great.

DSC_0262The main problem with saying Irving is a great writer or calling any of his books great is how workmanlike he is as an artist. His prose is always well crafted, but designed to mainly stay out of the way of his characters and plot. It doesn’t make you stumble, nor does it invite you to stop and admire individual lines or paragraphs. In many ways he follows and echoes American literary traditions, but all the major writers of that tradition had a style that was important and remarkable. Irving’s stylistic unremarkableness is not something we associate with great writers. And yet, a page of mature Irving is instantly recognizable. This is not a case of a writer like Paul Auster who would be better off writing screenplays instead of novels. Irving’s unremarkableness is not an inept blandness, or the merely serviceable writing that you’ll find in a lot of genre literature. Irving intentionally strikes a tone that has just the right wavelength to support and cushion his characters. He’s well aware of where his style could go. I was introduced to James Salter’s writing through remarks in Irving’s books, and he championed Salter and other stylistically acute writers consistently. Irving just chooses, I think, to craft his style differently. This explanation of mine, however, is not only tainted by the fact that I am a fan of his work, it also doesn’t change anything about the literary surface of his work. It doesn’t make his novels more directly capital-l Literary. The signifiers that we take to show us literary excellence are sidestepped by Irving. It’s not just the prose. It’s also his plots and characters. Irving is very self-consciously literary, and includes metafictional artifacts in his work, playing with the ideas of authorial identity and authority, offering us postmodern epistemologies and games. In many respects, however, these seem extraneous to the emotional core of his novels, which is the interior landscape of his characters. Irving can marshal music, myth and miracles in order to show us the alienated heart of a teenager in the New Hampshire province, but we are never deluded as to where his focus is: it’s always personal and emotional. That kind of writing shares a lot with partisan political essays: they tend to primarily appeal to those already converted. If you fail to be empathetic to the emotional narrative Irving has to tell, you are bound to enjoy the book you’re reading much less. That is not how we conventionally frame Literature, which we frame as having an appeal even when its content is objectionable.

DSC_0260What’s remarkable is how little all of this seems to bother Irving. There is no attempt in his work to be more “respectable”, although the madhouse that is A Son of the Circus is not something that he tried his hand on again. Irving is one of the rare writers who know what he can do well and what he wants to do. He’s written some short stories, but his style and method are a much better fit for long-form books, and so his stories are restricted to a faily slim volume called Trying to Save Peggy Sneed (1996) which, while not bad, is clearly not where his strength lies. Irving describes himself as an obsessive writer who lives for his craft and puts in 12 hour days at the computer when he is drafting. His method, as he outlines it in his Paris Review interview, is one where he accumulates a lot of material, writing faster than he can read, just revel in telling a story, including digressions. It is only afterwards that he goes about revising and sculpting the novel. But however he cuts and forms the text, the core of it, the obsessibe torrent of story, that part always remains. Irving does not betray his characters, he works them out through stories and events. They are not intended to stand in for anything else, they are part of a storytelling process and are treated kindly, if sharply, by Irving’s pen. And that has a lot of downside to it. Because Irving has so little interest in the intellectual construction of his novels, some of the associations and references can be a bit difficult, because of course his characters do signify beyond their paltry selves. Of course they do, and not just within the symbolic order of the individual book, but also within broader social or cultural contexts. But these signifying acts are often a bit displaced and muddy, because they are not consistently worked out. That said, this doesn’t happen all that much, because, despite his protest (“I’m not an analyst and I’m not an intellectual.”), he does ground many of his books politically and intellectually. From his contribution to the debate on abortion and female choice (The Cider House Rules) to his examination of the American state of mind during the Vietnam war (A Prayer for Owen Meany) and now gay and bisexual rights with the new book, there is not a lot of room for political ambiguity, however his plots and characters shake out.

DSC_0261In fact, despite Irving’s own protests and many critical readings, his books are more delicate and analytical than they are given credit for. The most recent one, In One Person, is a perfect example of this. One could look at it as an involving and evolving story of a young queer man’s discovery of sexuality and maturity, and it certainly works well from this angle. Irving’s protagonist William/Billy Abbott has a clear and sympathetic voice. We are told his story from his point of view, moving back and forth with the vagaries of a 70 year old man’s memories. The joys, tragedies and revelations of Billy’s life are basically offered to us without buffering or caution. If his readers are willing to follow, Billy will lead them through a story that contains numerous affairs, changes, death and a magnificent amount of small set pieces that Irving has spent a lifetime of honing his skills at. There are intrigues, betrayals and a multitude of secrets. Bigotry attacks the good people in Irving’s book, and they strength and honesty often wins out. It’s a cauldron of stories, all of them centered around Billy Abbott and his librarian friend, Miss Frost. This description seems a bit broad because I don’t want to spoil many of the book’s lovely surprises and turns. Not because there is some dramatic tension that will be punctured, some criminal whose identity will be revealed too early. No, it’s precisely because In One Person is more than just one excitable wave of story. It’s a very delicate artifact that uses its revelations and explanations as means to draw you in, to make you an active, complicit collaborator in its theater of identity. Because that’s really what it is, an almost 500 page long disquisition on identity. It uses actual theatrical performances as a way to both develop the topic intellectually, as well as quite practically involve the book’s characters in staged performances that mirror personal instances of performativity. There are men living as women, taking up a theme that goes all the way back in Irving’s work to Roberta Muldoon, the former football player. who famously said in The World According to Garp, “All men are liars“ and who, as Irving hastened to add “knew this was true because she had once been a man.” There are men living as men but performing women onstage. There are gay men perfoming heterosexuality, and there are bisexual people who perform all kinds of things. People burst into rooms to find perfomances, staged and unstaged.

DSC_0241And yet none of this reads as stiff as I make it sound, because below it all is the story of Billy, whose sexual awakening is told in perfect pitch, this itself being a literary performance. Because to all the above to this is the layer of the book itself, handing us a character that is biographically similar to its author, and who, as a novelist, narrates the book. This raises the question of the book itself as performance, which is one layer among many. This Chinese box of tales of identity that ultimately engulfs the whole of the book itself is not, however, some idle game. We have to give up things for choosing our own performance. Some have to give up a public life, like Miss Frost, some have to live liminal lives that only fully flower onstage and some die. Death is what we start off with, and the specter of AIDS. Billy was born 15 years after Merrill, but his view of the great scourge of the gay community in the 1980s ressemble’s Merrill’s. In elegy after beautiful elegy, Merrill struggled with being the one who was alive while so many of his friends died. In “Tony: Ending the Life”, Merrill writes

Mirrors are graves, as all can see:
Knew this emerging mask would outlast me,
Just as the life outlasts us, that we led?

Mirrors are transient images, but the “emerging mask” is also a kind of performance. Merrill’s work is full of roles performed, and of people about to enter stages. AIDS threatened the freedom of choice in this, the ability to free yourself from the bigotry of decades past that was ongoing at the time. It’s important to read In One Person from this angle to see what’s at stake in all the minor squabbles. Overall, the novel is a long coming of age book for a 70 year old bisexual author, who lost friends and acquaintances to time and this terrible disease. The book being his own performance, he examines what will outlast him, and what has outlasted those in his life that already passed on.

DSC_0265On top of all that, the book itself, beyond its status as a partially auto/biographical performance, sometimes feels like a sampler of many elements of Irving’s work. There may be no bears, but as mentioned above, a Roberta-like character is moved from minor character to heroine, the whole book is set in a smart New Hampshire town, more precisely, in a New England boarding school. Billy visits Vienna and he becomes, briefly, a wrestler. Sports itself is treated as another performance that allows participants to actively engage in roles and rituals. This interaction with Irving’s whole oeuvre points to the centrality of art. Art doesn’t magically make everything better, but I suspect Irving would agree with the spirit of Merrill’s assertion in “Farewell Performance”, another elegy dedicated to a friend who died of AIDS. Merrill starts his poem saying “Art. It cures affliction.“ – in a poem about someone who died, who we cannot save by writing a poem however exquisite. But in examining braveness and honesty we can stand up to “pity and terror”, as Merrill framed it. Some might criticize Irving’s novel for taking on such a socially important topic in such an Irvingian and quaint environment, but they would fail to understand how important art is to this book. Or to its author. This is what he also implies when he says, in the aforementioned Paris Review interview: “I am compulsive about writing, I need to do it the way I need sleep and exercise and food and sex“ – it is also a moral stance. In case it’s not become clear, I consider John Irving an important writer, wherever he may be in discussions of canon. And In One Person is an important book.

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